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Abstract 
Since 1896, the issue of “separate but equal” has been an ever present notion in American 
society. From water fountains to lunch counters, the use of public facilities and the receipt of 
public services have often been impacted by the ethno-racial group to which one belongs. One of 
the greatest examples of this circumstance can be found in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
wherein it was determined that separate public school facilities for African-American and 
Caucasian students were inherently unequal. Although the Supreme Court eradicated the 
“separate” premise of the “separate but equal” doctrine in the Brown decision, the ever elusive 
goal of providing equal educational opportunities to all of America’s students remains ephemeral. 
It is this notion of a right to equal educational opportunities that I examine through the lens of the 
landmark Supreme Court case San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973).  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Since 1896, the issue of “separate but equal” in regards to public facilities and 
services has been an ever present notion in American society. From water fountains to 
lunch counters, the use of public facilities and the receipt of public services have often 
been impacted by the ethno-racial group to which one belongs (Plessy v. Ferguson, 
1896). One of the greatest examples of this circumstance is found in the landmark 
Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) wherein it was determined 
that separate public school facilities for African-American and Caucasian students was 
inherently unequal (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). Although the Supreme Court 
eradicated the “separate” premise of the “separate but equal” doctrine in the Brown 
(1954) decision, the ever elusive goal of providing equal educational opportunities to all 
of America’s students remains ephemeral. As a result, it is hereby asserted that the 
inequitable funding of public schools through a state sponsored ad-valorem property tax 
system disparately impacts the students of comparatively underfunded school districts in 
terms of the educational opportunities they receive. Based on this premise, it is further 
asserted that such a funding scheme violates the equal protection rights of students so 
situated by providing enhanced educational opportunities for some and diminished 
educational opportunities for others. It is in this regard that State sponsorship of an ad-
valorem property tax public school funding system infringes upon a student’s right to 
property and further infringes upon a student’s right to liberty by restricting the 
employment opportunities a student may receive through the provision of comparatively 
diminished educational opportunities. Through a thorough examination of the historical 
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record and legal precedent, this paper endeavors to prove that one’s liberty and capacity 
to produce property is tethered to the measure and caliber of educational opportunities 
one receives and seeks to further establish the link between public school finance and 
equal educational opportunities.  
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Chapter II  
Review of Literature 
 
The Diminution of Race 
In order to fully explicate the nexus of education and property, one must first 
understand the historical context of the inequities of America’s public education system. 
Upon examining the disbursement of educational opportunities in the United States, one 
will find that issues of difference have been the primary driver of such inequities and that 
inequality has persisted in educational opportunities in the United States “for the past 
four centuries” (Johnson & Howard, 2009, p. 444). This is despite the widespread 
acknowledgement of the capacity of an education to be “a tool for empowerment and 
economic mobility for all” (Johnson & Howard, 2009, p. 444). Whether these differences 
have been tied to family history or ethnicity, these factors, among innumerable others 
“have had a significant influence on the types of [educational] opportunities afforded to 
individuals” (Johnson & Howard, 2009, p. 444-5).  
In efforts to convince the Supreme Court to equalize educational opportunities 
between students in the United States, the Brown (1954) legal team advanced an 
“ethnicity based” theory in to the Court’s justices in 1954 (Brown v. Board of Education, 
1954) (Winant, 2000, p. 178). Thurgood Marshall and his contemporaries saw race as a 
“culturally grounded framework for collective identity” and asserted this perspective as it 
was the most “mainstream” at the time (emphasis added) (Winant, 2000, p. 178). 
According to Howard Winant (2000), proponents of ethnicity-oriented theories of race 
assert that “the suppression of prejudiced attitudes could be achieved through contact, 
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integration, and assimilation” and that discrimination would dissipate through “laws and 
regulations that made jobs, education, and housing…equally accessible to all” (Winant, 
2000, p. 179).  Yet, in hindsight the Brown (1954) decision did not fully bring about an 
end to unequal educational opportunities for all students in the United States as hoped 
(Kozol, 1991). In short, the decision faced severe limitations from the outset. First, 
Brown (1954) lacked “adequate and specific guidelines for implementation”, and second, 
local school boards failed to design “equitable student assignment plans that desegregated 
schools and enhanced education for all children simultaneously” (Willie & Willie, 2005, 
p. 482). As a result, more than half a century later, inequity still exists in America’s 
public schools (Kozol, 1991).  However, because the racial grievances asserted in Brown 
(1954) were at least somewhat ameliorated by the Court’s ruling, the nation came to 
accept Brown’s (1954) ethnicity-based approach as a viable means for successfully 
achieving meaningful legal remedies (Winant, 2000, p. 178).  
Though I appreciate the magnitude and significance of social integration 
manifested by the Brown (1954) decision, a closer examination of the political and social 
circumstances surrounding the decision suggests that resolving the nation’s ethnic 
inequities may not have been the Court’s primary impetus when it delivered its edict. 
First, the domestic social climate shifted drastically after World War II. According to 
Derrick Bell, African-Americans went to war on behalf of a country that for centuries 
oppressed their race, “against a country [the Soviet Union] which in one generation raised 
[people of color] to the full human dignity of mankind” (Bell, 1980, p. 525). Further, as 
African-American servicemen returned home from World War II, they not only faced 
sustained discrimination, but also endured “violent attacks in the South which rivaled 
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those that took place at the conclusion of World War I” (Bell, 1980, p. 524). As a result, 
such circumstances prompted Waldo Martin (1998) to state: 
For more and more black freedom fighters as well as 
American politicians, postwar American apartheid was no 
longer domestically or geopolitically viable. The growing 
cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States 
highlighted the blatant contradiction between the American 
creed and the reality of America’s treatment of its black 
citizens (Martin, 1998, p. 6.).  
 
It is on this point that Bell (1980) asserts that the Brown (1954) decision served to 
reassure African-Americans that the “precepts of equality and freedom” were available to 
them (Bell, 1980, p. 524). Continuing, Bell (1980) further contends that the policymakers 
in the Brown decision possessed the ability to see the “economic and political advances at 
home and abroad” that would manifest with the “abandonment of segregation” through 
the Brown (1954) decision (Bell, 1980, p. 524). In short, as the South underwent the 
transformation from a rural, plantation society, the opportunity to transform the South 
into the “sunbelt” created the environment for economic profit (Bell, 1980, p. 525). As a 
result, “segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the South” 
(Bell, 1980, p. 525).  Lastly, due to the pressures of the international stage, America was 
compelled to grapple with its racial issues at home:  
As the putative leader of the “free world,” the United States 
had to get its domestic house in order. World leadership in 
an international community made up more and more of non 
aligned Third World nations—nations created principally 
by peoples of color—rendered Jim Crow unacceptable 
(Martin, 1998, p. 6). 
 
In essence, the Brown (1954) decision “helped to provide immediate credibility to 
America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging 
third world peoples” (Bell, 1980, p. 524). Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable to 
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believe that the greater social and political circumstances surrounding Brown’s (1954) 
decision may have validated Brown’s (1954) ethnicity based argument rather than the 
merits of the ethnicity based argument itself. As a result, it can be easily seen that “the 
declining legitimacy of racism in the United States stemmed from a mix of forces, both 
domestic and international, which came together mid-[20th] century (Martin, 1998, p. 60). 
 
 
The Colorblind Ideology of the Court 
Based on the above discussion of the circumstances surrounding the Brown 
(1954) decision, it is hereby asserted that the ethnicity based approach to securing legal 
remedies in education as offered by Brown (1954) may no longer be the firm foundation 
it was once heralded to be. Simply stated, times have changed (Bowman, 2009, p. 48). 
Instead of wrestling with domestic racial disparity, “the present moment is one of 
increasing globalization and post coloniality” (Winant, 2000, p. 180). Plainly, the ethnic 
perspective advanced by Brown (1954) was “informed and oriented to the pressing 
sociopolitical problems of its time: notably racial prejudice and discrimination”, with a 
particular emphasis on “state sponsored discrimination” (emphasis added) (Winant, 2000, 
p. 178). As a result, for the past thirty-four years, “the American conversation on race has 
been dominated by a debate over the morality, constitutionality, and the political efficacy 
of affirmative action” (Lawrence, 1995, p. 822). Further, because of affirmative action 
policies, “racial injustice [has become] less visible…and overt racism [is] generally 
stigmatized” (Winant, 2000, p. 178). Thus, America has come to believe that dismantling 
“officially sanctioned racial inequality [is] permissible [but]…to create racial equality 
through positive state action [is] not” (Winant, 2002). Due to this circumstance, there is 
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now room for the assertion that because “the demands of the civil rights movement have 
largely been met…the United States has entered a “post-racial” stage of its history” 
(Winanat, 2002). For this reason, I assert that Brown’s (1954) ethnicity-based approach 
reached its limit in the legal realm at the close of the twentieth century (Winant, 2000, p. 
178). However, as we are now past the first decade of the twenty-first, if we are to 
advance equal educational opportunities for all of America’s students, a viable racial 
theory must “address the persistence of ethnic classification and stratification in an era 
officially committed to racial equality and multiculturalism” (Winant, 2000, p.180). In 
short, a winning argument must be crafted in the neo-conservative, “colorblind” ideology 
as it is the prevailing law of the land (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District, 2006). 
In an attempt to establish a colorblind argument to bring about equity in 
education, the neo-conservative tree from with this colorblind branch springs forth must 
first be examined. Renowned for its proclamation that the Constitution is colorblind, the 
dissent of Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
cannot be overlooked. He wrote:  
In view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in 
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. 
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In 
respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law 
(Martin, 1998, p. 23). 
 
According to Martin (1998), “less well known and less often discussed was Harlan’s 
embrace of de facto white supremacy and his opposition to any kind of social equality 
between the races” (Martin, 1998, p. 23). Martin asserts that Harlan accepted state 
sponsored segregation in public schools as it was consistent with the free exercise of a 
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state’s power (Martin, 1998, p. 23). As a result, Harlan’s dissent “proved to be very 
influential in large measure precisely because of its double edge” (Martin, 1998, p.23). 
Further, as the “doctrine of natural rights frames the liberal view of citizenship”, 
such in turn “informs the neo-conservative vision of race” (Winant, 1997, p. 80). As race 
is not one of those listed among the natural rights to life, liberty and property (Locke, 
1952), the neo-conservative position finds that race lacks meaning (Winant, 1998, p. 
760). According to Howard Winant, “for neo-conservatism, racial difference is 
something to be overcome, a blight on the core US values—both politically and culturally 
speaking—of universalism and individualism” (Winant, 1997, p. 80). The neo-
conservative argument further advances “universalism in social policy”, including critical 
educational or literary standards, citing its “far greater capacity to represent race in 
egalitarian and democratic terms” (Winant, 1997, p. 80). Basely stated, “the neo-
conservative project has cast doubt on the tractability of issues of racial equality” arguing 
that State intervention cannot alleviate social inequity, “but in fact only exacerbates it” 
(Winant, 1997, p. 80). 
 According to the colorblind legal theory, the premise of equal citizenship is 
“primarily concerned with protecting individuality” (Lawrence, 1995, p. 822). As a 
result, in this perspective, all racial classifications are looked upon with suspicion 
(Lawrence, 1995, p. 823) as according to the neo-conservative position, “every 
invocation of racial significance manifests ‘race thinking’” (Winant, 1997, p.80). In 
essence, the colorblind perspective equates race consciousness to racism, and thereby 
parallels a lack of race consciousness to non-racism (Winant, 1998, p. 760). As a result, 
the use of ethnic differences as an argument for equalization in American society has 
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become untenable (Winant, 1997, p.80). “Thus, when the Supreme Court rules that 
individualism and meritocracy are the only legitimate criteria for employment decisions 
or university admissions today, it inevitably and simultaneously represents race as 
illusory and spurious” (Winant, 1998, p. 756). Such a conclusion by the Court has room 
to be drawn as “there [is] no timeless and absolute standard for what constitutes racism” 
as “social structures” and “[racial] discourses” are always being reformed (Winant, 1998, 
p. 761). By disregarding “unique human individuality” and focusing on the “irrelevance” 
of race to humanness”, the colorblind ideology gives primary rank to our status as 
citizens (emphasis added) (Lawrence, 1995, p. 823). Basely, this “nonsubstantative” 
approach advances the individualist right “unconstrained by reference to continuing 
societal conditions of inequality” and “is privileged in relation to the eradication of those 
conditions” (Lawrence, 1995, p. 824-5). If such is truly the case (and this author believes 
that it is), then the argument that advances the cause of equal educational opportunities 
for all of America’s students must offer its logic with race and ethnicity in absentia. 
Simply stated, if an argument is to be presented to the Court that can successfully 
convince it to establish education as a fundamental right of citizenship, this colorblind, 
neo-conservative ideological perspective must be recognized, accepted, and placated by 
an argument crafted in it. Through a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973), I attempt to wield Justice Harlan’s “double-edged 
sword” of colorblind individualism and universalism to establish equal educational 
opportunities for all of America’s citizens.  
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Chapter III 
Background - San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973) 
 In the state of Texas, the financing of public elementary and secondary schools 
results from contributions at both the state and local levels. Nearly-fifty percent of the 
funds collected are retained from a state funded program created to ensure a minimally 
basic education for all students enrolled in the state’s public school system. At the local 
level, each district contributes to financing its schools through an ad-valorem tax on 
property within the district. The appellees, on behalf of Rodriguez, sought relief under the 
assertion that Texas’ system of public school finance favors the more affluent through its 
emphasis on property taxation and violates the equal protection rights of school children 
claiming to be members of impoverished families residing in school districts with a 
comparatively low property tax base. This claim is based on the fact that substantial inter-
district disparities in per-pupil expenditures result foremost from differences in the value 
of assessable property between the Edgewood Independent School District and the 
Alamo Heights Independent School District (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). 
As evidenced in the case, the comparison between Egdewood (least affluent) and 
Alamo (most affluent) school districts served to highlight the “substantial disparities” 
caused by the use of the ad valorem property tax system to fund public education (San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). In the Edgewood School District, approximately 22,000 
students are enrolled in its twenty-five elementary and secondary schools (San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 1973). The district finds itself located in an inner-city area having little 
commercial or industrial property. Further, the district’s residents are predominately 
Mexican-American. As a result, “approximately 90% of the student population” of the 
11 
Edgewood school district is Mexican-American and “over 6% is Negro” (San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 1973). Continuing, the average assessed property value for students in the 
district is valued at $5,960.00 per pupil with a median family income of $4,686.00” (San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Both of these figures are the lowest in the metropolitan area 
(San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Taxed at an “equalized rate of $1.05 per $100.00 of 
assessed property—the highest in the metropolitan area—the [Edgewood] district 
contributed $26.00 to the education of each child” (emphasis added) (San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 1973). In contrast, “Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San 
Antonio” and educates approximately 5,000 students “in a residential community quite 
unlike the Edgewood District” (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). According to the facts 
of the case, the school population in the Alamo Heights district is overwhelmingly Anglo 
with a Mexican-American population of 18% and a “Negro” population of less than 1% 
(San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). However, the assessed property value per student in 
the Alamo district “exceeds $49,000.00” (more than 8 times that of Edgewood) with a 
median family income of $8,001.00 (more than 1.5 times that of Edgewood) (San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Accordingly, at a local tax rate of $.85 per $100.00 (in 
comparison to $1.05 per $100 in Edgewood), $333.00 was rendered for pupil instruction 
(in comparison to Edgewood’s $26.00, which equates to a $307.00 differential) (San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). As these gross disparities are “largely attributable to 
differences in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation”, the Texas 
District Court found that “Texas’ dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause” of the Constitution of the United States as the system was found to 
“discriminate on the basis of wealth in the manner in which education is provided for its 
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people” (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). In short, the District Court determined that 
wealth is a “suspect” classification and that education is a “fundamental” right, and 
asserted that Texas’ system could be upheld only upon the State’s showing that there was 
a compelling State interest for the system (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). The District 
Court further found that the State failed to meet this standard as it could not articulate a 
reasonable or rational basis for its system (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). As a result, 
certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court upon appeal by the San Antonio School 
District.  
Primarily, there were two fundamental questions before the Supreme Court in the 
Rodriguez (1973) matter. (1) Did the Texas system of financing public education operate 
to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right 
guaranteed explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny, and (2) if the Texas system does operate to the disadvantage of some 
suspect class, or impinges either explicitly or implicitly on a constitutionally guaranteed 
right, does it further a legitimate, articulated state purpose, thereby permissibly violating 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to assess the merits 
of the San Antonio case based on the above standard, the Supreme Court first 
investigated the existence of a suspect class. 
In order to establish a suspect class from the facts presented, the Court was bound 
by precedent (Britt v. North Carolina, 1971) (Gardner v. California, 1969) (Draper v. 
Washington, 1963) (Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 1958) (Williams v. Illinois, 
1970) (Tate v. Short, 1971) (Bullock v. Carter, 1972). Although the lower court found the 
theory of “wealth discrimination” valid, the Supreme Court rejected this perspective 
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asserting that the lower court failed to consider the “hard threshold questions” of: (1) 
whether the class of disadvantaged “poor” can be identified or defined in traditional equal 
protection terms, and (2) whether the relative, as opposed to absolute, degree of 
deprivation asserted is significant enough to be considered an impermissible violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). In short, the Court found 
that such a “large, diverse, and amorphous class” unified by only one common factor, the 
relative wealth of the families in a given school district, cannot be defined as a suspect 
class (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Further, because education “is not among the 
rights afforded explicit protection” under the Constitution, and because the Court could 
not “find any basis” for saying [education] is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution the Court found that no fundamental right was violated, despite the Court’s 
open acknowledgement and straight forward assessment of the gross disparities created 
by the Texas system (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973).  Instead, the Court excused the 
inequalities by stating that Texas’ dual system of funding public education “bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose”, namely the providing of a basic 
education for every child in the state and the preservation of significant control of school 
districts at the local level (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). As a result, the Court held 
that the San Antonio (1973) case did not qualify to be examined under strict judicial 
scrutiny as it found that the Texas system of public school finance did not impermissibly 
violate any fundamental right guaranteed explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution (San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Further, though the Court found that the Texas system 
violated no rights, the Court asserts that even if a violation had been established, such 
infringement would be permissible because the Rodriguez (1973) case “involves the most 
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delicate and difficult questions” of local control. In other words, the Court maintains that 
the State’s preservation of local control of schools is of primary concern when addressing 
issues of inequity in education finance (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973).  
Simply stated, I wholeheartedly disagree with the Court on its finding that no 
suspect class or violation of a fundamental right exists. However, I nonetheless assert that 
the Court’s conclusion is correct, if one understands the neo-conservative logic that led to 
it. In short, even if a suspect class were to be reasonably established by my or any other 
argument, I assert that such would be discarded almost immediately by the current neo-
conservative ideology of the Court. Because the “claim for group rights stands in formal 
contradiction to the [neo-conservative] principle of individualism”, establishing a suspect 
class, the first step in proving discrimination, becomes a high hurdle to overcome (Bell, 
1972, p. 58). Thus, the traditional method of dismantling inequity through arguments of 
discrimination against a suspect class is considered by this author to be antiquated. As a 
result, a new, colorblind, property rights-based approach asserted in the neo-conservative 
framework is believed to be the best way to achieve equality in educational opportunities 
in the twenty-first century. 
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Chapter IV 
State Violations of Constitutional Rights & Liberties  
 
 New Age Reasoning - Education as a Fundamental Right 
Upon close examination of the Rodriguez (1973) case, the burden of proof to 
declare education as a right readily establishes itself. As “education is of course not 
among the rights afforded protection under our Federal Constitution”, “the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution” (emphasis added) (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). In these statements, 
the Court entertains the notion that in order to deem education a right, education must be 
established as a “pre-requisite to the meaningful exercise of [an established 
constitutional] right” (emphasis added) (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). It must be 
proven that the State, in some way “deprive[s]”, “infringe[s]”, or “interfere[s]” with “the 
free exercise of some such fundamental right or liberty” (emphasis added) (San Antonio 
v. Rodriguez, 1973). As a result, I assert that the use of an ad-valorem property tax 
system to fund public education as in the Rodriguez (1973) case first violates a student’s 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and second, impermissibly infringes upon a 
student’s substantive and procedural due process rights to liberty and property. 
 
State Violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Fundamental Flaw) 
 
 First, it must be understood that Texas’ (and any other state) system of financing 
public education is mandated, operated, governed, and enshrined in the state’s 
constitution and statutes. As a result, when the State decided that it would employ an ad-
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valorem property tax system to finance public education, it decided that the funds for 
educating the students of a particular locale would be derived from the tax revenues 
generated from the residential, industrial, and commercial property contained within a 
given school district. Though, “the Equal Protection Clause permits a state to divide 
different kinds of property into classes and to assign to each a different tax burden so 
long as those divisions and burdens are neither arbitrary nor capricious” (emphasis 
added) (Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County, 1989), in any case, however, it must be 
recognized that these divisions “are shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and other 
governmental land-use controls” determined by the State (Serrano v. Priest, 1971). As 
commercial and industrial property, “which augments a district's tax base”, “is distributed 
unevenly throughout the state”, the fact that “governmental action drew the school 
district boundary lines” cannot be ignored as through its action, the State itself arbitrarily 
determined “how much local wealth each district would contain” (Serrano v. Priest, 
1971). By using the ad-valorem property tax system as the funding mechanism for public 
education, by arbitrarily drawing district boundaries which in turn restricts the generation 
of educational revenues to the quantity and State assessed value of the residential, 
industrial, and commercial property contained within a district, the State has purposefully 
and intentionally decided “to allot more educational dollars to the children of one district 
than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence” of certain types of 
property (Serrano v. Priest, 1971). Based on the overwhelming funding disparities 
generated by the ad-valorem property tax system (as evidenced by the facts of and 
recognized by the Supreme Court in the Rodriguez (1973) case), it is hereby asserted that 
State sponsorship of such a system of financing public education denies the equal 
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protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States to certain students as it differentially treats similarly situated persons in 
terms of the educational opportunities they receive based solely on the quantity and State 
assessed value of the property contained within a given school district. In pertinent part, 
the Amendment states,  
No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
 
 
State Violation of the Right to Liberty  
 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Daniels v. Williams (1986), the 
Fourteenth Amendment “is the source of three different kinds of constitutional 
protection” (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring).  “First, it incorporates 
specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights” to the states, chief among them being 
the fundamental tenets of the Fifth Amendment (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, 
concurring).  Second, “it contains a substantive component”, known as substantive due 
process, “which bars certain arbitrary government actions “regardless of the fairness of 
the procedures used to implement them”” (original quotes included) (Daniels v. Williams, 
1986) (Stevens, J, concurring). Third, the Due Process Clause “is a guarantee of fair 
procedure, sometimes referred to as “procedural due process”” (original quotes included) 
(Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring). In other words, the State may not 
deprive an individual of property “without providing appropriate procedural safeguards” 
(Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring). 
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As shown above and recognized by the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is written in “broad and majestic terms” (Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972).  
Specifically acknowledging the polymorphous definitions of “liberty” and “property”, the 
Court found that such terms are among the “great [constitutional] concepts…purposely 
left to gather meaning from experience” (Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972). As a result, 
“though the term has received much consideration”, “without doubt [liberty] denotes the 
right of the individual to engage in any of the common occupations of life”, and “to 
acquire useful knowledge”, and “generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (emphasis added) (Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 1972). Such a belief prompted the Court to state, “In a Constitution for a 
free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad indeed” 
(Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972). Further, in defining the parameters of property, the 
Court maintains that property interests “may take many forms” (Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 1972). Though “property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution”,  
“rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -- rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims’ of entitlement to 
those benefits” (Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972). Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
was free to reassert the fundamental principle established in Goss v. Lopez (1975) in 
Debra P. v. Turlington (1981) that states, “Among other things, the State is constrained to 
recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest 
which may be protected by the Due Process Clause” (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981). 
“Based upon this implied property right”,  I assert that the use of the ad-valorem property 
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tax system to fund public education as employed in the Rodriguez (1973) case violates 
certain students’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights to 
liberty and property by denying them equal educational opportunities (Debra P. v. 
Turlington, 1981). In addition, I further maintain that through its use of the ad-valorem 
property tax system to fund public education, a state violates Title 20, Chapter 31, 
§1221–1 of the United States Code which states in pertinent part: 
Recognizing that the Nation’s economic, political, and social 
security require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress  
 
1. reaffirms, as a matter of high priority, the Nation’s goal 
of equal educational opportunity, and  
2. declares it to be the policy of the United States of 
America that every citizen is entitled to an education to 
meet his or her full potential without financial barriers (20 
U.S.C. §1221-1). 
 
In addition, I further assert that such students are entitled to injunctive relief under Title 
42, §1983 of the United States Code which states in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress…(42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 
As stated by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Daniels v. Williams (1986), 
“the type of Fourteenth Amendment interest that is implicated has important effects on 
the nature of the constitutional claim and the availability of § 1983 relief” (Daniels v. 
Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring).  Further, “if the claim is in the first category (a 
violation of one of the specific constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights) [(in this 
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case, liberty and property)], a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of 
a state remedy” (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring). “Similarly, if the 
claim is in the second category (a violation of the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause), a plaintiff may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a 
state remedy” (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring).  For as it pertains to 
substantive due process, “no less than with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, if the 
Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain actions “regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them,” the constitutional violation is 
complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken; the independent federal remedy is then 
authorized by the language and legislative history of § 1983” (emphasis added) (Daniels 
v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, concurring). However, “a claim in the third category -- a 
procedural due process claim -- is fundamentally different” (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) 
(Stevens, J, concurring).  “In such a case, the deprivation [of a fundamental right] may be 
entirely legitimate…but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to 
provide appropriate procedural safeguards” (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) (Stevens, J, 
concurring). As a result, “in a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of 
property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty 
without due process of law -- without adequate procedures” that violates the Constitution. 
Thus, “even though the State may have every right to deprive a person of his property or 
his liberty, the individual may nevertheless be able to allege a valid §1983 due process 
claim, perhaps because a predeprivation hearing must be held, or because the state 
procedure itself is fundamentally flawed” (emphasis added) (Daniels v. Williams, 1986) 
(Stevens, J, concurring) (see “Fundamental Flaw” (p. 15)). Based on the foregoing, I 
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assert that Texas’ (and any state’s) use of the ad-valorem property tax system to fund 
public education violates all of the forgoing fundamental tenets. As a result, I will now 
attempt to show how such a violation occurs. 
Defining educational equality as the point when the average educational 
achievement of all student groups is roughly equal” (Green, 2009, p. 301), educational 
inequality is defined as “qualitatively distinctive educational experiences and processes 
that produce inequitable outcomes” (Johnson, 2009, p. 446). As a result, Gloria Ladson-
Billings asserts that “property relates to education in explicit and implicit ways” (Ladson-
Billings, 1995, p 53). As evidenced in the Rodriguez case, it has been indicated that 
school districts with increased property values are endowed by the State via the ad-
valorem property tax system with greater revenue for a given school district by 
comparison (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973).  As a result, property relates to education 
in the first sense as it pertains to intellectual property and equal educational opportunities. 
As the quality and quantity of a school’s curriculum varies directly with the measure of 
revenues generated from the ad-valorem property tax system of the schools’ 
corresponding district, property bears a significant influence on the curriculum taught in 
schools. In short,  
The availability of “rich” [(or enriched)] intellectual 
property [(curriculum)] delimits what is now called 
“opportunity to learn”—the presumption that along with 
providing educational “standards” that detail what students 
should know and be able to do, they must have material 
resources that support their learning. Thus, intellectual 
property must be undergirded by “real” property, that is 
science labs, computers and other state-of-the-art 
technologies, appropriately certified and prepared teachers 
(Ladson-Billings, p. 54).  
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Simply stated, the vast majority of the schools in the United States are 
underfunded as a result of the nearly universal use of the ad-valorem property tax system, 
“especially those in low-wealth states and in low-wealth school districts” (Thomas, 2002, 
p. 781). As successfully demonstrated by Jonathan Kozol in his book Savage Inequalities 
(1991), schools that have comparatively little to no resources comparatively present 
students with little or no opportunity to learn (as defined above) (Kozol, 1991). As a 
result, students in comparatively underfunded school districts are compelled by law to 
attend schools that “lack adequate instructional materials and access to technology” 
(Thomas, 2002, p. 781). Though the social benefit of compulsory education is 
undeniable, it must be recognized that compulsion by law “trigger[s] a state’s affirmative 
obligation to provide certain services [equally] to those citizens it chooses to confine” 
(Right, 2007, p. 30). As stated in the Youngberg (1982) case, due process requires that the 
nature and duration of the State’s confinement of an individual must “bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is confined” (Right, 2007, p. 
32). As a result, chief among the capacities with which the State must endow children in 
public schools are “sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work 
intelligently”, and “sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in 
academics or in the job market” (emphasis added) (Elder, 2009, p. 158). This sentiment 
was underscored by the Kentucky State Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education (1989) wherein the Court stated,  
…each child educated in the system should develop to full 
capacity: 1) literacy; 2) mathematical ability; 3) knowledge 
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of government sufficient to equip the individual to make 
informed choices as a citizen; 4) self-knowledge sufficient 
to intelligently choose life work; 5) vocational or advanced 
academic training; 6) recreational pursuits; 7) creative 
interests; 8) social ethics (emphasis added) (Rose v. 
Council, 1989). 
 
Under a combined due process/equal protection analysis, the converse of the 
Youngberg (1982) decision states that it would be constitutionally impermissible to 
restrain an individual for training and then provide the individual with comparatively 
diminished training. As compulsory education laws require students attend school, 
students of a school district with a comparatively reduced amount of commercial and 
industrial property drawn within their boundaries are compelled to attend schools that 
present them with comparatively diminished educational opportunities. Such can be seen 
to “infringe on a student’s undeniably broad liberty interests by precluding the student 
from pursuing activities that would otherwise be possible and by forcing a certain type of 
instruction upon the student” (Right, 2007, p. 30). As a result, when a state fails to 
provide educational opportunities equally to all of its students, certain students are 
inevitably harmed while others are inevitably enhanced via compulsory education laws. 
Therefore, I assert that the State “withhold[s] certain especially important” educational 
opportunities from the residents of a certain district while affording them to others based 
solely on the arbitrary boundaries imposed upon them by the State through the use of the 
ad-valorem property tax system (Kadrmas v. Dickinson, 1988). This is how the State 
violates certain students’ rights to liberty, through compelling their attendance by law and 
subsequently providing them with comparatively diminished training.         
 
 
24 
State Violation of the Right to Property  
 
Summarily stated, students attending school in a district whose boundaries have 
been drawn by the State to contain “better” property “attend better staffed and resourced 
schools with higher qualified teachers, smaller class sizes, and additional enrichment 
courses” (Johnson, 2009, p. 448).  Though the point of “higher qualified teachers” is but 
one in a host of many criterion that could be examined in terms of equal educational 
opportunities, such cannot go unexamined in this writing. According to Farkas (2003), 
“the school resources that show the most promise as determinants of student learning are 
the human capital of teachers” (Farkas, 2003, p. 1135). Further, Mickleson (2001) 
describes qualified teachers as “the single most important school resource linked to 
opportunities to learn” (emphasis added) (Mickleson, 2001, p. 580). As a result, even the 
Coleman Report (1966), which contentiously asserted the “insignificance of resources” to 
education, states that “differences in teacher quality have a cumulative effect on student 
achievement over the years and those differences influence the academic achievement of 
[students]” (Wong, 2004, p. 130). Thus, students who are disadvantaged by educational 
inequity in public schools “are left behind” from the start (Thomas, 2002, p. 782). In 
short, the fact that “students need highly qualified teachers and appropriate, up-to-date 
learning materials” cannot be ignored (Welner, 2005, p. 246).  
Further, because credentialed teachers have been extensively educated in 
pedagogy and subject matter, “they need to be paid salaries that reflect this training” 
(Welner, 2005, p. 246). As qualified instructors find themselves “employed within a 
competitive labor market…each is free to seek the job with the most attractive 
combination of working conditions and monetary compensation” (emphasis added) 
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(Farkas, 2003, p. 1135). Thus, “it is not surprising that the lowest-income, lowest-
performing schools have the greatest difficulty recruiting and retaining highly skilled and 
qualified teachers” (Farkas, 2003, p. 1135). Because comparatively underfunded school 
districts lack the resources to hire and retain qualified teachers due to the funding 
constraints imposed upon them by the arbitrary boundaries created, applied, and enforced 
by the State through its use of the ad-valorem property tax system, the number of students 
per class is propelled upward in a comparatively underfunded district. However, as found 
by the Tennessee State Legislature in its Project STAR (Student/Teacher Achievement 
Ratio) and Lasting Benefits studies, large class sizes hinders a students’ capacity to learn 
(Green, 2006, p. 42). Conducted from 1985-1989, Project STAR was a study that 
“limited kindergarten, first, second, and third grade class sizes to between thirteen and 
seventeen students” (Green, 2006, p. 42). “The second phase, the Lasting Benefits Study, 
was an observation of the consequences of Project STAR once the children returned to 
regular-sized classrooms”, and the third phase, Project Challenge, “was a policy 
intervention in which the seventeen poorest school districts in the state received 
additional funding to reduce class sizes in kindergarten to third grade” (Green, 2006, p. 
42). In Project STAR, “students in the small-sized classes demonstrated significant gains 
in academic performance” where the Lasting Benefits Study found that “children enrolled 
in smaller classes continued to outperform those students educated in regular sized 
classes, even after they returned to regular sized classrooms” (Green, 2006, p. 43). In 
addition, 
With respect to Project Challenge, researchers found that 
student performance in seventeen school districts improved 
significantly in reading and mathematics. In reading, the 
academic performance of second graders on standardized 
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tests improved from an average ranking of ninety-ninth 
place out of 139 districts on 1990 to seventy-eighth place in 
1993. In math, the academic ranking of the seventeen 
districts improved from eighty-fifth place to fifty-sixth 
place in 1993 (Green, 2006, p. 43).  
 
 As comparatively underfunded schools often lack adequate school supplies and 
materials, a school district that is enriched by the State via the ad-valorem property tax 
system is free to provide enhanced educational opportunities (i.e. qualified teachers and 
small class sizes) to its students because the State has inherently endowed such a district 
with the resources to do so through its actions in arbitrarily determining school district 
boundaries (Johnson, 2009, p. 450). However, at the same time, the State, through its use 
of the same ad-valorem property tax system, provides diminished educational 
opportunities to other students by not allowing for the same opportunity to learn based 
solely on the “fortuitous presence” of commercial and industrial property (Serrano v. 
Priest, 1971). Therefore, I renew my assertion that the State, through its maintenance of 
the ad-valorem property tax system of funding public education, violates the equal 
protection rights of certain students as the State denies “especially important” educational 
opportunities to the students of comparatively underfunded school districts based solely 
on the amount of commercial and industrial property contained within district’s 
arbitrarily drawn, State enforced boundaries (Kadrmas v. Dickinson, 1988). Plainly 
stated, “regardless of where a child lives and attends school, he or she should have access 
to [equal educational opportunities]” (Green, 2008, p. 309).  
Further, according to Brown (1954), education must be considered in light of its 
current importance to society (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). As a result, it must 
be understood that “education [in America] is situated within a capitalist economic 
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system” (Johnson, 2009, p. 447). Further, because of national and international 
competition, the post-industrial American economy is in now in need of persons 
possessing technical skill (Halsey, 1997, p. 600). Thus, education has become the 
primary means of obtaining “technical skill” (Bell, 1972, p. 41) or as economists define 
it, “human capital” (Bills, 1988, p. 440). The concept of human capital stems from the 
belief that schooling produces either general (those transferrable across firms) or specific 
job skills (Bills, 1988, p. 440). This view further holds that schooling “changes people in 
ways that make them more attractive to employers…as schooling provides the general 
skills needed to master the more specific skills of the workplace” (Bills, 1988, p. 440). As 
a result, schooling becomes “the first and decisive opportunity for merit to be gained” 
(Halsey, 1997, p. 666). Such being the case, this notion of “merit” is more than worthy of 
examination.  
Underpinning the American democracy is the belief that America is a meritocratic 
society. Framed by the “twin axes of individualism and rationality”, the American creed 
advances the notion that the individual is endowed with the “freedom to fulfill his own 
purposes” (Bell, 1972, p. 58).  According to John Locke, the noted political theorist 
whose work in the Two Treatises of Government is widely known to have influenced the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, Locke notes that every individual has 
property in his or her own person, and that “the labor of [the individual’s] body and the 
work of [that person’s] hands…are properly theirs” (emphasis added) (Locke, 1952, p. 
17). As a result, “the unencumbered individual” is entitled to achieve his aspirations on 
the basis of his work”—“by his labor to gain property [in its various forms], by exchange 
to satisfy wants, [and] by upward mobility, to achieve a place commensurate with his 
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talents” (emphasis added) (Bell, 1972, p. 40). In addition, further serving to underscore 
the meritocratic ideology is the principle of equality (Bell, 1972, p. 41). As Locke states, 
all have a right to “perfect freedom and uncontrolled enjoyment” of all the rights and 
freedoms necessary “to preserve the property the individual creates” (emphasis added) 
(Locke, 1952, p. 49). Further, the State is charged with the responsibility of preserving of 
the rights to property for all members of society “as far as is possible” (Locke, 1952, p. 
49). As a direct result of Lockean ideology, the foregoing sentiment can be found loudly 
echoing in the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States (Wood, 
1969, p. 219) which state: 
5th Amendment: 
No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. 
 
14th Amendment, Section 1: 
No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
 
At this point in this writing, it must be understood that the Lockean school of 
thought is the framework within which our rights and privileges as American citizens are 
based (Wood, 1969, p. 219). Thus, Locke’s notion that man is endowed by nature with 
the capacity to create property is a mainstay of both the American Constitution and this 
writing. As a result, in the following pages, I attempt to show how the State’s denial of 
equal educational opportunities through use of the ad-valorem property tax system to 
fund public education infringes upon a student’s personal liberty and further denies and 
diminishes a student’s capacity to create property, both of which are violations of their 
constitutionally protected Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.   
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As “[i]ncreasingly, the newer professional occupations, particularly engineering 
and economics, [have] become central to the decisions of the society” (Bell, 1972, p. 41), 
it follows then that not only is America a meritocratic society, but by virtue, a credential 
based society as well. According to the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 
2025: A World Transformed: “[a]s global business grows increasingly borderless and 
labor markets more seamless, education has become a key determinant of countries’ 
economic performance and potential” (National, 2008, p. 17) . As a result, “adequate 
primary education is essential, but the quality and accessibility of secondary and higher 
education will be even more important for determining whether societies successfully 
graduate up the value-added production ladder” (National, 2008, p. 17). Thus, in today’s 
American society the measure of one’s education has become the arbiter of job selection, 
with reports indicating that employers regard education as “a screening device to select 
workers with “proper” values” (Cohen, 1986, p. 3).  
Because of the current nature of American society, hiring practices “proceed from 
the premise that the task of [job] selection is to match individuals with the most 
appropriate or highest level of necessary skills to the jobs or occupations” being offered 
(Cohen, 1986, p. 1). From a technical perspective, “hiring standards reflect employers’ 
needs to screen workers on the basis of [the] intellectual and technical complexity of the 
job” (Cohen, 1986, p. 2). Such is the case because employers maintain that “education 
and other hiring requirements…index worker’s values, attitudes, and loyalty” (Cohen, 
1986, p. 3). As the future success of the American economy will depend on several 
factors, chief among them being new production processes and expanded trade, Frank 
Levy states that the economy will “favor better educated workers over less educated 
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workers” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 22). In addition, as Levy further contends that America’s 
economic vitality will rest upon the equalizing of the quality of the nation’s institutions, 
public and private education among others, he asserts an example:  
[I]n the 1950s the continuing mechanization of agriculture 
both made farming more efficient and displaced large 
numbers of farm laborers. Often however, farm laborers 
could get on a bus to a city where they could find factory 
jobs at higher pay. In other words, the 1950’s economy was 
not skill-biased: Low skilled workers displaced in one 
industry could get good jobs in another and so incomes 
automatically grew throughout the distribution (Shapiro, 
2001, p. 22). 
 
He continues,  
Today, [however,] the economy favors the better educated 
over the less educated. When computerization or 
international trade displaces a semi-skilled worker, the 
move to a good job means acquiring the training to become 
a computer repairman or a laboratory technician, a much 
harder move than getting on a bus (Shapiro, 2001, p. 22). 
 
As a result of the forgoing, it follows then that the current, post-industrial 
American society is a meritocracy wherein one’s capacity to create, gain, and retain 
property is “based on technical skills and higher education” (Bell, 1972, p. 30). As John 
Rawls states, all must be guaranteed the “requisite primary goods to enable them to make 
intelligent and effective use of their freedoms” (Rawls, 2001, p. 14). Simply stated, 
public school education must ensure that America’s students are trained to be 
“internationally competitive” and that they are equipped with the “best available 
knowledge”(Liu, 2006, p. 26). Thus, I maintain that the unequal educational opportunities 
created by the use of the ad-valorem property tax system endows some students with 
increased technical skill (intangible personal property) through comparatively enhanced 
educational opportunities, and that such opportunities in-turn increase their capacity to 
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produce property through gainful employment in the field of their choosing. However, 
the same system infringes upon the property rights of other students by providing them 
with diminished educational opportunities, thereby comparatively diminishing their 
technical skill, thus depriving them of economically necessary intangible personal 
property. In addition, I further assert that based on the relationship between education and 
employment as shown above, the State’s depravation of equal educational opportunities 
via the ad-valorem property tax system in turn illegally restricts a citizen’s liberty by 
constraining his or her choice of life occupation. As stated by the Supreme Court in 
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), the liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment 
“denotes…the right of the individual…to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life…” (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923). A deprivation of this right, as exacted by the State 
through use of the ad-valorem property tax system, is hereby additionally seen as a 
violation of a citizen’s fundamental Thirteenth Amendment protections. The amendment 
reads:  
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.  
 
As Bruce Ackerman states, “When read as a whole, the Reconstruction 
Amendments create four tiers of national protection. The first tier is established by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” (Balkin, 2001, 
pp. 102-103). He continues, 
This by itself creates a vast grant of freedom to every 
American. We should not view “slavery” and “involuntary 
servitude” as names of ancient practices long since 
abolished. The Thirteenth Amendment requires an ongoing 
test of existing status relationships to determine whether 
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they mask these forbidden conditions under another name 
(Balkin, 2001, p. 103). 
 
It must be understood that in any circumstance, “a man or woman is in a position 
of involuntary servitude whenever he or she lacks the freedom to exercise a wide range of 
legal rights of self determination” (Balkin, 2001, p. 103) (Pollock v. Williams, 1944) 
(United States v. Gaskin, 1944) (Taylor v. Georgia, 1942). As shown above, education is 
a perquisite of employment in a given field. Thus, when the State provides the resources 
for certain students to receive enhanced educational opportunities while denying those 
same opportunities to others similarly situated, it inevitably broadens the horizons of 
certain students while diminishing the horizons of others. By denying equal protection of 
the laws to certain students via the provision of unequal educational opportunities 
through use of the ad-valorem property tax system, the State deprives certain students of 
their right to intangible personal property without due process of law and thereby restricts 
those students’ freedom to choose their life’s occupation. In is in this regard that the State 
violates those students’ constitutional safeguard against involuntary servitude. Therefore, 
based on the forgoing and the burden of proof to establish education as a fundamental 
right of citizenship as set forth by the Rodriguez (1973) case, that education must be 
established as a “pre-requisite to the meaningful exercise of [an established 
constitutional] right, I boldly assert that there exists a fundamental right to equal 
educational opportunities protected by the Constitution of the United States and further 
assert that State sponsorship of the ad-valorem property tax system to fund public 
education violates a student’s right to equal protection of the laws, his or her substantive 
and procedural due process rights to liberty and property, as well as Title 20, Chapter 31, 
Section 1221–1 of the United States Code. As a result, I further assert that such students 
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are entitled to injunctive relief via the provisions of Title 42, Section 1983 of the United 
States Code. 
34 
Chapter V 
Conclusion-Principles of Justice 
Since its founding, America has claimed itself to be a land where all are equally 
free to pursue life, liberty, and happiness uninhibited by law. This liberal view sees 
individuals to be “self-originating sources of valid claims” and that all are “entitled to 
equal consideration”, justice, regardless of their station in life (Tan, 2004, p. 9). 
Therefore, if American society is to maintain its steadfast belief in the “principle of self-
determination” (Tan, 2004, p. 102), then we must honor the fact that “considerations of 
justice aim to secure equal opportunity and fair background conditions for [all] persons 
and societies in pursuit of their ends” (Tan, 2004, p. 71). 
As stated by Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall in his concurrence in 
Plyler v. Doe (1981), the Rodriguez (1973) case “implicitly acknowledged that certain 
interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in 
equal protection analysis” (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., concurring). In arriving at 
this conclusion, Justice Marshall asserted an example. As “the Court's decisions long 
have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications bearing on the right to vote in state 
elections…Rodriguez confirmed the “constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment in the voting process”” (original quotes included) (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) 
(Marshall, T., concurring). Though ““the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally 
protected right””, regulation of the electoral process still receives “unusual scrutiny” 
because “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is 
preservative of other basic civil and political rights” (original quotes included) (Plyler v. 
Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., concurring). In other words, 
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The right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment 
because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary 
right: a citizen cannot hope to achieve any meaningful 
degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior 
right of participation in the political process.  Those denied 
the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to 
second-class status… In a sense, then, denial of an 
education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the 
former relegates the individual to second-class social 
status; the latter places him at a permanent political 
disadvantage (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., 
concurring). 
 
In short, “When the State provides [educational opportunities] to some and denies it to 
others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally 
inconsistent with those purposes…of the Equal Protection Clause (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) 
(Marshall, T., concurring).   
If America claims to be a land of self-determination, so too must it claim to be a 
land of equal opportunity. As the principle of self-determination dictates that the 
individual is fully responsible for his or her own station in life, when an individual is 
denied the opportunity to enhance his capabilities through equal educational opportunities 
he or she is inevitably hindered because of the link between capabilities and income. As a 
result, Sen is free to state, “[a] child who is denied the opportunity of elementary 
schooling is not only deprived as a youngster, but also handicapped all through life” as 
the child is “deprived not only in terms of well-being, but also in terms of the ability to 
lead responsible lives” (Sen, 1999, p. 284). Such a sentiment was loudly echoed by the 
Supreme Court when it ruled,  
[D]enial of education to some isolated group of children 
poses an affront to one of the goals  of the Equal Protection 
Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting 
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of 
individual merit.  Paradoxically, by depriving the children 
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of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the 
means by which that group might raise the level of esteem 
in which it is held by the majority.  But more directly, 
“education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society” (original quotes included) 
(Plyler v. Doe, 1981). 
 
  Plainly stated, withholding educational opportunities from a student is the 
equivalent of denying “essential health care to the ill” and such “is a failure of social 
responsibility” (Sen, 1999, p. 288). Even Adam Smith, noted author of A Wealth of 
Nations (1776) and whose philosophies underpin the modern version of American 
capitalism, believed in the power of education. He states, “[t]he difference between the 
most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for 
example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education” 
(emphasis added) (Sen, 1999, p. 295). It cannot be mistaken that “children denied [equal 
educational opportunities] are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive 
disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve” (Plyler 
v. Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., concurring). More importantly, however, “when those 
children are members of an identifiable group, that group -- through the State's action -- 
will have been converted into a discrete underclass” (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., 
concurring). 
If America seeks to hold true to its premise that each of its citizens retains the 
right to unimpeded self-determination, then the United States can no longer afford to 
provide unequal educational opportunities to its students. “If the citizenship guarantee 
means full membership, equal standing, and effective participation in the national polity”, 
we cannot relegate “schoolchildren to the uneven distribution of opportunity resulting 
from highly varied state effort and fiscal capacity” (Liu, 2006, p. 23). As a result, 
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America must seek “not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right 
and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result” (Wong, 2004, p. 134). 
Specifically, it must be understood that “equality of opportunity has been based on 
tensions between the principle of merit, which assumes procedural fairness in the 
evaluation of individual qualifications for positions, and equality of life chances, which 
states that background characteristics should not predict future positions” (Wong, 2004, 
pp. 133-4). As a result, public education cannot be reduced to some mere “governmental 
“benefit” indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.  Both the 
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its 
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction” (Plyler v. Doe, 1981).  Further, 
as the “American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance”, “it does not take an advanced degree to 
predict the effects of a complete denial of [equal educational opportunities] upon those 
children targeted by the State's classification” (Plyler v. Doe, 1981) (Marshall, T., 
concurring). Thus, the “inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, 
intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to 
individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a 
status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the 
Equal Protection Clause” (Plyler v. Doe, 1981). Therefore, based on the connection 
between equal educational opportunities and the rights to liberty and property as 
indicated above, I assert that there exists a fundamental right to equal educational 
opportunities and that use of the ad-valorem property tax system to fund public education 
in the United States violates the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed to students 
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by Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. Without doubt, the words of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954) are as salient today as they were the day the ink dried: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education 
to our democratic society.  It is required in the performance 
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is 
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms 
(emphasis added) (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954). 
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